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GELI(8) System Manager's Manual GELI(8) NAME geli -- control utility for the cryptographic GEOM class SYNOPSIS To compile GEOM_ELI into your kernel, add the following lines to your kernel configuration file: device crypto options GEOM_ELI Alternatively, to load the GEOM_ELI module at boot time, add the fol- lowing line to your loader.conf(5): geom_eli_load="YES" Usage of the geli utility: geli init [-bdgPRTv] [-a aalgo] [-B backupfile] [-e ealgo] [-i iterations] [-J newpassfile] [-K newkeyfile] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] [-V version] prov ... geli label - an alias for init geli attach [-Cdprv] [-n keyno] [-j passfile] [-k keyfile] prov ... geli detach [-fl] prov ... geli stop - an alias for detach geli onetime [-dRT] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] prov geli configure [-bBdDgGrRtT] prov ... geli setkey [-pPv] [-i iterations] [-j passfile] [-J newpassfile] [-k keyfile] [-K newkeyfile] [-n keyno] prov geli delkey [-afv] [-n keyno] prov geli kill [-av] [prov ...] geli backup [-v] prov file geli restore [-fv] file prov geli suspend [-v] -a | prov ... geli resume [-pv] [-j passfile] [-k keyfile] prov geli resize [-v] -s oldsize prov geli version [prov ...] geli clear [-v] prov ... geli dump [-v] prov ... geli list geli status geli load geli unload DESCRIPTION The geli utility is used to configure encryption on GEOM providers. The following is a list of the most important features: o Utilizes the crypto(9) framework, so when there is crypto hardware available, geli will make use of it automatically. o Supports many cryptographic algorithms (currently AES-XTS, AES-CBC, and Camellia-CBC). o Can optionally perform data authentication (integrity verifi- cation) utilizing one of the following algorithms: HMAC/SHA1, HMAC/RIPEMD160, HMAC/SHA256, HMAC/SHA384 or HMAC/SHA512. o Can create a User Key from up to two, piecewise components: a passphrase entered via prompt or read from one or more pass- files; a keyfile read from one or more files. o Allows encryption of the root partition. The user is asked for the passphrase before the root filesystem is mounted. o Strengthens the passphrase component of the User Key with: B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification, Version 2.0., RFC, 2898. o Allows the use of two independent User Keys (e.g., a "user key" and a "company key"). o It is fast - geli performs simple sector-to-sector encryp- tion. o Allows the encrypted Master Key to be backed up and restored, so that if a user has to quickly destroy key material, it is possible to get the data back by restoring keys from backup. o Providers can be configured to automatically detach on last close, so users do not have to remember to detach providers after unmounting the filesystems. o Allows attaching a provider with a random, one-time Master Key, which is useful for swap partitions and temporary filesystems. o Allows verification of data integrity (data authentication). o Allows suspending and resuming encrypted devices. The first argument to geli indicates an action to be performed: init Initialize providers which need to be encrypted. If multi- ple providers are listed as arguments, they will all be ini- tialized with the same passphrase and/or User Key. A unique salt will be randomly generated for each provider to ensure the Master Key for each is unique. Here you can set up the cryptographic algorithm to use, Data Key length, etc. The last sector of the providers is used to store metadata. The init subcommand also automatically writes metadata backups to /var/backups/_prov_.eli file. The metadata can be recov- ered with the restore subcommand described below. Additional options include: -a aalgo Enable data integrity verification (authen- tication) using the given algorithm. This will reduce the size of storage available and also reduce speed. For example, when using 4096 bytes sector and HMAC/SHA256 al- gorithm, 89% of the original provider stor- age will be available for use. Currently supported algorithms are: HMAC/SHA1, HMAC/RIPEMD160, HMAC/SHA256, HMAC/SHA384 and HMAC/SHA512. If the option is not given, there will be no authentication, only en- cryption. The recommended algorithm is HMAC/SHA256. -b Try to decrypt this partition during boot, before the root partition is mounted. This makes it possible to use an encrypted root partition. One will still need bootable un- encrypted storage with a /boot/ directory, which can be a CD-ROM disc or USB pen-drive, that can be removed after boot. -B backupfile File name to use for metadata backup instead of the default /var/backups/_prov_.eli. To inhibit backups, you can use none as the backupfile. If multiple providers were ini- tialized in the one command, you can use PROV (all upper-case) in the file name, and it will be replaced with the provider name. If PROV is not found in the file name and multiple providers were initialized in the one command, -_prov_ will be appended to the end of the file name specified. -d When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo `*' characters. This makes the length of the passphrase visible. -e ealgo Encryption algorithm to use. Currently sup- ported algorithms are: AES-XTS, AES-CBC, Camellia-CBC, and NULL. The default and recommended algorithm is AES-XTS. NULL is unencrypted. -g Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem. The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads loader(8) from the en- crypted partition. -i iterations Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2 when processing User Key passphrase compo- nent. If this option is not specified, geli will find the number of iterations which is equal to 2 seconds of crypto work. If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used. PKCS#5v2 processing is performed once, after all parts of the passphrase component have been read. -J newpassfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key (or part of it). If newpassfile is given as -, standard input will be used. Only the first line (excluding new-line character) is taken from the given file. This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the ef- fect of reassembling a single passphrase split across multiple files. Cannot be com- bined with the -P option. -K newkeyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key (or part of it). If newkeyfile is given as -, standard input will be used. This argument can be speci- fied multiple times, which has the effect of reassembling a single keyfile split across multiple keyfile parts. -l keylen Data Key length to use with the given cryp- tographic algorithm. If the length is not specified, the selected algorithm uses its default key length. AES-XTS 128, 256 AES-CBC, Camellia-CBC 128, 192, 256 -P Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key. Cannot be combined with the -J option. -s sectorsize Change decrypted provider's sector size. Increasing the sector size allows increased performance, because encryption/decryption which requires an initialization vector is done per sector; fewer sectors means less computational work. -R Turn off automatic expansion. By default, if the underlying provider grows, the en- crypted provider will grow automatically too. The metadata will be moved to the new location. If automatic expansion if turned off and the underlying provider changes size, attaching encrypted provider will no longer be possible as the metadata will no longer be located in the last sector. In this case GELI will only log the previous size of the underlying provider, so metadata can be found easier, if resize was done by mistake. -T Don't pass through BIO_DELETE calls (i.e., TRIM/UNMAP). This can prevent an attacker from knowing how much space you're actually using and which sectors contain live data, but will also prevent the backing store (SSD, etc) from reclaiming space you're not using, which may degrade its performance and lifespan. The underlying provider may or may not actually obliterate the deleted sec- tors when TRIM is enabled, so it should not be considered to add any security. -V version Metadata version to use. This option is helpful when creating a provider that may be used by older FreeBSD/GELI versions. Con- sult the "HISTORY" section to find which metadata version is supported by which FreeBSD version. Note that using an older version of metadata may limit the number of features available. attach Attach the given providers. The encrypted Master Keys are loaded from the metadata and decrypted using the given passphrase/keyfile and new GEOM providers are created using the specified provider names. A ".eli" suffix is added to the user specified provider names. Multiple providers can only be attached with a single attach command if they all have the same passphrase and keyfiles. Additional options include: -C Do a dry-run decryption. This is useful to verify passphrase and keyfile without decrypt- ing the device. -d If specified, the decrypted providers are de- tached automatically on last close, so the user does not have to remember to detach providers after unmounting the filesystems. This only works when providers were opened for writing, and will not work if the filesystems on the providers were mounted read-only. Probably a better choice is the -l option for the detach subcommand. -n keyno Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to use (could be 0 or 1). If the index number is not provided all keys will be tested. -j passfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key (or part of it). For more information see the description of the -J option for the init subcommand. The same pass- files are used for all listed providers. -k keyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key (or part of it). For more information see the description of the -K option for the init subcommand. The same key- files are used for all listed providers. -p Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Keys. Cannot be combined with the -j op- tion. -r Attach read-only providers. They are not opened for writing. detach Detach the given providers, which means remove the devfs en- try and clear the Master Key and Data Keys from memory. Additional options include: -f Force detach - detach even if the provider is open. -l Mark provider to detach on last close, after the last filesystem has been unmounted. If this option is speci- fied, the provider will not be detached while it is open, but will be automatically detached when it is closed for the last time even if it was only opened for reading. onetime Attach the given providers with a random, one-time (ephemeral) Master Key. The command can be used to encrypt swap partitions or temporary filesystems. Additional options include: -a aalgo Enable data integrity verification (authenti- cation). For more information, see the de- scription of the init subcommand. -e ealgo Encryption algorithm to use. For more infor- mation, see the description of the init sub- command. -d Detach on last close, after the last filesys- tem has been unmounted. Note: this option is not usable for temporary filesystems as the provider is detached after the filesystem has been created. It still can, and should, be used for swap partitions. For more informa- tion, see the description of the attach sub- command. -l keylen Data Key length to use with the given crypto- graphic algorithm. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. -s sectorsize Change decrypted provider's sector size. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. -R Turn off automatic expansion. For more in- formation, see the description of the init subcommand. -T Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. For more infor- mation, see the description of the init sub- command. configure Change configuration of the given providers. Additional options include: -b Set the BOOT flag on the given providers. For more in- formation, see the description of the init subcommand. -B Remove the BOOT flag from the given providers. -d When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo `*' characters. This makes the length of the passphrase visible. -D Disable echoing of any characters when a passphrase is entered to boot from this encrypted root filesystem. This hides the passphrase length. -g Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem. The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads loader(8) from the encrypted partition. -G Deactivate booting from this encrypted root partition. -r Turn on automatic expansion. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. -R Turn off automatic expansion. -t Enable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. -T Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. setkey Install a copy of the Master Key into the selected slot, en- crypted with a new User Key. If the selected slot is popu- lated, replace the existing copy. A provider has one Master Key, which can be stored in one or both slots, each en- crypted with an independent User Key. With the init subcom- mand, only key number 0 is initialized. The User Key can be changed at any time: for an attached provider, for a de- tached provider, or on the backup file. When a provider is attached, the user does not have to provide an existing passphrase/keyfile. Additional options include: -i iterations Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2. If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used. To be able to use this option with the setkey subcommand, only one key has to be defined and this key must be changed. -j passfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of a current User Key (or part of it). -J newpassfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the new User Key (or part of it). -k keyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of a current User Key (or part of it). -K newkeyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the new User Key (or part of it). -n keyno Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to change (could be 0 or 1). If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key used for attaching the provider will be changed. If the provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) and no key number is given, the first Master Key copy to be successfully decrypted with the provided User Key passphrase/key- file will be changed. -p Do not use a passphrase as a component of the current User Key. Cannot be combined with the -j option. -P Do not use a passphrase as a component of the new User Key. Cannot be combined with the -J option. delkey Destroy (overwrite with random data) the selected Master Key copy. If one is destroying keys for an attached provider, the provider will not be detached even if all copies of the Master Key are destroyed. It can even be rescued with the setkey subcommand because the Master Key is still in memory. Additional options include: -a Destroy all copies of the Master Key (does not need -f option). -f Force key destruction. This option is needed to destroy the last copy of the Master Key. -n keyno Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy. If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key used for attaching the provider will be destroyed. If provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) the key number has to be given. kill This command should be used only in emergency situations. It will destroy all copies of the Master Key on a given provider and will detach it forcibly (if it is attached). This is absolutely a one-way command - if you do not have a metadata backup, your data is gone for good. In case the provider was attached with the -r flag, the keys will not be destroyed, only the provider will be detached. Additional options include: -a If specified, all currently attached providers will be killed. backup Backup metadata from the given provider to the given file. restore Restore metadata from the given file to the given provider. Additional options include: -f Metadata contains the size of the provider to ensure that the correct partition or slice is attached. If an attempt is made to restore metadata to a provider that has a different size, geli will refuse to restore the data unless the -f switch is used. If the partition or slice has been grown, the resize subcommand should be used rather than attempting to relocate the metadata through backup and restore. suspend Suspend device by waiting for all inflight requests to fin- ish, clearing all sensitive information such as the Master Key and Data Keys from kernel memory, and blocking all fur- ther I/O requests until the resume subcommand is executed. This functionality is useful for laptops. Suspending a lap- top should not leave an encrypted device attached. The suspend subcommand can be used rather than closing all files and directories from filesystems on the encrypted device, unmounting the filesystem, and detaching the device. Any access to the encrypted device will be blocked until the Master Key is reloaded through the resume subcommand. Thus there is no need to close nor unmount anything. The suspend subcommand does not work with devices created with the onetime subcommand. Please note that sensitive data might still be present in memory locations such as the filesystem cache after suspending an encrypted device. Additional options include: -a Suspend all geli devices. resume Resume previously suspended device. The caller must ensure that executing this subcommand does not access the suspended device, leading to a deadlock. For example, suspending a device which contains the filesystem where the geli utility is stored is a bad idea. Additional options include: -j passfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key, or part of it. For more information see the description of the -J option for the init subcommand. -k keyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key, or part of it. For more information see the description of the -K option for the init subcommand. -p Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key. Cannot be combined with the -j op- tion. resize Inform geli that the provider has been resized. The old metadata block is relocated to the correct position at the end of the provider and the provider size is updated. Additional options include: -s oldsize The size of the provider before it was resized. version If no arguments are given, the version subcommand will print the version of geli userland utility as well as the version of the ELI GEOM class. If GEOM providers are specified, the version subcommand will print metadata version used by each of them. clear Clear metadata from the given providers. WARNING: This will erase with zeros the encrypted Master Key copies stored in the metadata. dump Dump metadata stored on the given providers. list See geom(8). status See geom(8). load See geom(8). unload See geom(8). Additional options include: -v Be more verbose. KEY SUMMARY Master Key Upon init, the geli utility generates a random Master Key for the provider. The Master Key never changes during the lifetime of the provider. Each copy of the provider metadata, active or backed up to a file, can store up to two, independently-encrypted copies of the Master Key. User Key Each stored copy of the Master Key is encrypted with a User Key, which is generated by the geli utility from a passphrase and/or a keyfile. The geli utility first reads all parts of the keyfile in the order specified on the command line, then reads all parts of the stored passphrase in the order specified on the command line. If no passphrase parts are specified, the system prompts the user to enter the passphrase. The passphrase is optionally strengthened by PKCS#5v2. The User Key is a digest computed over the concatenated keyfile and passphrase. Data Key During operation, one or more Data Keys are deterministically derived by the kernel from the Master Key and cached in memory. The number of Data Keys used by a given provider, and the way they are derived, de- pend on the GELI version and whether the provider is configured to use data authentication. SYSCTL VARIABLES The following sysctl(8) variables can be used to control the behavior of the ELI GEOM class. The default value is shown next to each vari- able. Some variables can also be set in /boot/loader.conf. kern.geom.eli.version Version number of the ELI GEOM class. kern.geom.eli.debug: 0 Debug level of the ELI GEOM class. This can be set to a number between 0 and 3 inclusive. If set to 0, minimal debug informa- tion is printed. If set to 3, the maximum amount of debug in- formation is printed. kern.geom.eli.tries: 3 Number of times a user is asked for the passphrase. This is only used for providers which are attached on boot, before the root filesystem is mounted. If set to 0, attaching providers on boot will be disabled. This variable should be set in /boot/loader.conf. kern.geom.eli.overwrites: 5 Specifies how many times the Master Key is overwritten with random values when it is destroyed. After this operation it is filled with zeros. kern.geom.eli.visible_passphrase: 0 If set to 1, the passphrase entered on boot will be visible. This alternative should be used with caution as the entered passphrase can be logged and exposed via dmesg(8). This vari- able should be set in /boot/loader.conf. kern.geom.eli.threads: 0 Specifies how many kernel threads should be used for doing software cryptography. Its purpose is to increase performance on SMP systems. If set to 0, a CPU-pinned thread will be started for every active CPU. kern.geom.eli.batch: 0 When set to 1, can speed-up crypto operations by using batch- ing. Batching reduces the number of interrupts by responding to a group of crypto requests with one interrupt. The crypto card and the driver has to support this feature. kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit: 8192 Specifies how many Data Keys to cache. The default limit (8192 keys) will allow caching of all keys for a 4TB provider with 512 byte sectors and will take around 1MB of memory. kern.geom.eli.key_cache_hits Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was already in cache. This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit specified in kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit. kern.geom.eli.key_cache_misses Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was not in cache. This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit specified in kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit. kern.geom.eli.unmapped_io En- able support for unmapped I/O buffers, currently implemented only on 64-bit platforms. This is an optimization which re- duces the overhead of I/O processing. This variable is in- tended for debugging purposes and must be set in /boot/loader.conf. EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, and 1 if the command fails. EXAMPLES Initialize a provider which is going to be encrypted with a passphrase and random data from a file on the user's pen drive. Use 4kB sector size. Attach the provider, create a filesystem, and mount it. Do the work. Unmount the provider and detach it: # dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/da2.key bs=64 count=1 # geli init -s 4096 -K /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach -k /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da2.eli bs=1m # newfs /dev/da2.eli # mount /dev/da2.eli /mnt/secret ... # umount /mnt/secret # geli detach da2.eli Create an encrypted provider, but use two User Keys: one for your em- ployee and one for you as the company's security officer (so it is not a tragedy if the employee "accidentally" forgets his passphrase): # geli init /dev/da2 Enter new passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase) Reenter new passphrase: # geli setkey -n 1 /dev/da2 Enter passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase) Enter new passphrase: (let your employee enter his passphrase ...) Reenter new passphrase: (... twice) You are the security officer in your company. Create an encrypted provider for use by the user, but remember that users forget their passphrases, so backup the Master Key with your own random key: # dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` bs=64 count=1 # geli init -P -K /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e # geli backup /dev/ada0s1e /mnt/pendrive/backups/`hostname` (use key number 0, so the encrypted Master Key will be re-encrypted by this) # geli setkey -n 0 -k /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e (allow the user to enter his passphrase) Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: Encrypted swap partition setup: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/ada0s1b bs=1m # geli onetime -d ada0s1b # swapon /dev/ada0s1b.eli The example below shows how to configure two providers which will be attached on boot, before the root filesystem is mounted. One of them is using passphrase and three keyfile parts and the other is using only a keyfile in one part: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0 bs=1m # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key0 bs=32k count=1 # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key1 bs=32k count=1 # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key2 bs=32k count=1 # geli init -b -K /boot/keys/da0.key0 -K /boot/keys/da0.key1 -K /boot/keys/da0.key2 da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da1s3a bs=1m # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da1s3a.key bs=128k count=1 # geli init -b -P -K /boot/keys/da1s3a.key da1s3a The providers are initialized, now we have to add these lines to /boot/loader.conf: geli_da0_keyfile0_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile0_type="da0:geli_keyfile0" geli_da0_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da0.key0" geli_da0_keyfile1_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile1_type="da0:geli_keyfile1" geli_da0_keyfile1_name="/boot/keys/da0.key1" geli_da0_keyfile2_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile2_type="da0:geli_keyfile2" geli_da0_keyfile2_name="/boot/keys/da0.key2" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_load="YES" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile0" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key" If there is only one keyfile, the index might be omitted: geli_da1s3a_keyfile_load="YES" geli_da1s3a_keyfile_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile" geli_da1s3a_keyfile_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key" By convention, these loader variables are called geli_<device>_load. However, the actual name prefix before _load, _type, or _name does not matter. At boot time, the geli module searches through all <prefix>_type-like variables that have a value of "<device>:geli_keyfile". The paths to keyfiles are then extracted from <prefix>_name variables. In the example above, prefix is "geli_da1s3a_keyfile". Not only configure encryption, but also data integrity verification us- ing HMAC/SHA256. # geli init -a hmac/sha256 -s 4096 /dev/da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach /dev/da0 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0.eli bs=1m # newfs /dev/da0.eli # mount /dev/da0.eli /mnt/secret geli writes the metadata backup by default to the /var/backups/_prov_.eli file. If the metadata is lost in any way (e.g., by accidental overwrite), it can be restored. Consider the fol- lowing situation: # geli init /dev/da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: Metadata backup can be found in /var/backups/da0.eli and can be restored with the following command: # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0 # geli clear /dev/da0 # geli attach /dev/da0 geli: Cannot read metadata from /dev/da0: Invalid argument. # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0 # geli attach /dev/da0 Enter passphrase: If an encrypted filesystem is extended, it is necessary to relocate and update the metadata: # gpart create -s GPT ada0 # gpart add -s 1g -t freebsd-ufs -i 1 ada0 # geli init -K keyfile -P ada0p1 # gpart resize -s 2g -i 1 ada0 # geli resize -s 1g ada0p1 # geli attach -k keyfile -p ada0p1 Initialize provider with the passphrase split into two files. The provider can be attached using those two files or by entering "foobar" as the passphrase at the geli prompt: # echo foo > da0.pass0 # echo bar > da0.pass1 # geli init -J da0.pass0 -J da0.pass1 da0 # geli attach -j da0.pass0 -j da0.pass1 da0 # geli detach da0 # geli attach da0 Enter passphrase: foobar Suspend all geli devices on a laptop, suspend the laptop, then resume devices one by one after resuming the laptop: # geli suspend -a # zzz <resume your laptop> # geli resume -p -k keyfile gpt/secret # geli resume gpt/private Enter passphrase: To create a geli encrypted filesystem with a file as storage device follow this example. First a file named private0 is created in /usr and attached as a memory disk like /dev/md0 for example. # dd if=/dev/zero of=/usr/private0 bs=1m count=256 # chmod 0600 /usr/private0 # mdconfig -t vnode -f /usr/private0 It is recommended to place the following line in rc.conf(5) to have the memory disk automatically created during boot. mdconfig_md0="-t vnode -f /usr/private0" After /dev/md0 is created a random key has to be generated and stored in a secure location, like /root for example. This key should be pro- tected by a passphrase, which is requested when geli init is called. # dd if=/dev/random of=/root/private0.key bs=64 count=1 # geli init -K /root/private0.key -s 4096 /dev/md0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach -k /root/private0.key /dev/md0 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/md0.eli bs=1m Once the initialization of the /dev/md0.eli device is ready create a UFS filesystem and mount it for example in /private. # newfs /dev/md0.eli # mount /dev/md0.eli /private After a system reboot the geli device can be mounted again with the following commands. The call of geli attach will ask for the passphrase. It is recommended to do this procedure after the boot, be- cause otherwise the boot process would be waiting for the passphrase input. # geli attach -k /root/private0.key /dev/md0 Enter passphrase: # mount /dev/md0.eli /private ENCRYPTION MODES geli supports two encryption modes: XTS, which was standardized as IEEE P1619 and CBC with unpredictable IV. The CBC mode used by geli is very similar to the mode ESSIV. DATA AUTHENTICATION geli can verify data integrity when an authentication algorithm is specified. When data corruption/modification is detected, geli will not return any data, but instead will return an error (EINVAL). The offset and size of the corrupted data will be printed on the console. It is important to know against which attacks geli provides protection for your data. If data is modified in-place or copied from one place on the disk to another even without modification, geli should be able to detect such a change. If an attacker can remember the encrypted data, he can overwrite any future changes with the data he owns without it being noticed. In other words geli will not protect your data against replay attacks. It is recommended to write to the whole provider before first use, in order to make sure that all sectors and their corresponding checksums are properly initialized into a consistent state. One can safely ig- nore data authentication errors that occur immediately after the first time a provider is attached and before it is initialized in this way. SEE ALSO crypto(4), gbde(4), geom(4), loader.conf(5), gbde(8), geom(8), crypto(9) HISTORY The geli utility appeared in FreeBSD 6.0. Support for the Camellia block cipher was implemented by Yoshisato Yanagisawa in FreeBSD 7.0. Highest GELI metadata version supported by the given FreeBSD version: FreeBSD GELI version version 6.0 0 6.1 0 6.2 3 6.3 3 6.4 3 7.0 3 7.1 3 7.2 3 7.3 3 7.4 3 8.0 3 8.1 3 8.2 5 9.0 6 10.0 7 AUTHORS Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org> FreeBSD 13.2 April 18, 2022 GELI(8)
NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | KEY SUMMARY | SYSCTL VARIABLES | EXIT STATUS | EXAMPLES | ENCRYPTION MODES | DATA AUTHENTICATION | SEE ALSO | HISTORY | AUTHORS
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