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SECURITY(7)		 Miscellaneous Information Manual	     SECURITY(7)

NAME
     security -- introduction to security under FreeBSD

DESCRIPTION
     Security  is a function that begins and ends with the system administrator.
     While all BSD multi-user systems have some inherent security,  the  job  of
     building  and  maintaining  additional  security  mechanisms  to keep users
     `honest' is probably one of the single largest undertakings of  the  sysad-
     min.   Machines  are only as secure as you make them, and security concerns
     are ever competing with the human necessity for convenience.  Unix systems,
     in general, are capable of running a huge number of simultaneous  processes
     and  many of these processes operate as servers - meaning that external en-
     tities can connect and talk to them.   As	yesterday's  mini-computers  and
     mainframes  become  today's desktops, and as computers become networked and
     internetworked, security becomes an ever bigger issue.

     Security is best implemented through a layered onion approach.  In  a  nut-
     shell,  what  you want to do is to create as many layers of security as are
     convenient and then carefully monitor the system for  intrusions.	 You  do
     not  want	to overbuild your security or you will interfere with the detec-
     tion side, and detection is one of the single most important aspects of any
     security mechanism.  For example, it makes little sense  to  set  the  schg
     flags  (see  chflags(1)) on every system binary because while this may tem-
     porarily protect the binaries, it prevents a hacker who has broken in  from
     making  an easily detectable change that may result in your security mecha-
     nisms not detecting the hacker at all.

     System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of attack,  in-
     cluding  attacks  that attempt to crash or otherwise make a system unusable
     but do not attempt to break root.	Security concerns can be split	up  into
     several categories:

	   1.	Denial of service attacks

	   2.	User account compromises

	   3.	Root compromise through accessible servers

	   4.	Root compromise via user accounts

	   5.	Backdoor creation

     A denial of service attack is an action that deprives the machine of needed
     resources.   Typically,  D.O.S. attacks are brute-force mechanisms that at-
     tempt to crash or otherwise make a machine  unusable  by  overwhelming  its
     servers  or  network  stack.  Some D.O.S. attacks try to take advantages of
     bugs in the networking stack to crash a machine with a single packet.   The
     latter  can  only be fixed by applying a bug fix to the kernel.  Attacks on
     servers can often be fixed by properly specifying options to limit the load
     the servers incur on the system under adverse conditions.	Brute-force net-
     work attacks are harder to deal with.  A spoofed-packet attack,  for  exam-
     ple, is nearly impossible to stop short of cutting your system off from the
     Internet.	It may not be able to take your machine down, but it can fill up
     Internet pipe.

     A	user  account compromise is even more common than a D.O.S. attack.  Many
     sysadmins still run standard telnetd, rlogind, rshd, and  ftpd  servers  on
     their  machines.	These servers, by default, do not operate over encrypted
     connections.  The result is that if you have any moderate-sized user  base,
     one  or  more of your users logging into your system from a remote location
     (which is the most common and convenient way to login  to	a  system)  will
     have  his or her password sniffed.  The attentive system admin will analyze
     his remote access logs looking for suspicious  source  addresses  even  for
     successful logins.

     One  must always assume that once an attacker has access to a user account,
     the attacker can break root.  However, the reality is that in  a  well  se-
     cured  and maintained system, access to a user account does not necessarily
     give the attacker access to root.	The  distinction  is  important  because
     without  access  to  root the attacker cannot generally hide his tracks and
     may, at best, be able to do nothing more than mess with the user's files or
     crash the machine.  User account compromises are very common because  users
     tend not to take the precautions that sysadmins take.

     System  administrators  must  keep  in mind that there are potentially many
     ways to break root on a machine.  The attacker may know the root  password,
     the  attacker may find a bug in a root-run server and be able to break root
     over a network connection to that server, or the attacker may know of a bug
     in an suid-root program that allows the attacker to break root once he  has
     broken into a user's account.  If an attacker has found a way to break root
     on a machine, the attacker may not have a need to install a backdoor.  Many
     of the root holes found and closed to date involve a considerable amount of
     work  by  the  hacker  to cleanup after himself, so most hackers do install
     backdoors.  This gives you a convenient way to detect the	hacker.   Making
     it  impossible for a hacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimen-
     tal to your security because it will not close  off  the  hole  the  hacker
     found to break in the first place.

     Security  remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered `onion
     peel' approach and can be categorized as follows:

	   1.	Securing root and staff accounts

	   2.	Securing root - root-run servers and suid/sgid binaries

	   3.	Securing user accounts

	   4.	Securing the password file

	   5.	Securing the kernel core, raw devices, and file systems

	   6.	Quick detection of inappropriate changes made to the system

	   7.	Paranoia

SECURING THE ROOT ACCOUNT AND SECURING STAFF ACCOUNTS
     Don't bother securing staff accounts if you haven't secured  the  root  ac-
     count.   Most  systems  have  a password assigned to the root account.  The
     first thing you do is assume that the  password  is  `always'  compromised.
     This  does  not  mean that you should remove the password.  The password is
     almost always necessary for console access to the machine.   What	it  does
     mean is that you should not make it possible to use the password outside of
     the  console or possibly even with a su(1) command.  For example, make sure
     that your pty's are specified as being unsecure in the `/etc/ttys' file  so
     that  direct  root  logins  via  telnet or rlogin are disallowed.	If using
     other login services such as sshd, make sure that direct  root  logins  are
     disabled  there  as  well.  Consider every access method - services such as
     ftp often fall through the cracks.  Direct root logins should only  be  al-
     lowed via the system console.

     Of  course, as a sysadmin you have to be able to get to root, so we open up
     a few holes.  But we make sure these holes require additional password ver-
     ification to operate.  One way to make root accessible is to add  appropri-
     ate  staff  accounts to the wheel group (in /etc/group).  The staff members
     placed in the wheel group are allowed to `su' to root.   You  should  never
     give  staff  members native wheel access by putting them in the wheel group
     in their password entry.  Staff accounts should  be  placed  in  a  `staff'
     group,  and  then added to the wheel group via the `/etc/group' file.  Only
     those staff members who actually need to have root access should be  placed
     in  the  wheel  group.   It  is also possible, when using an authentication
     method such as kerberos, to use kerberos's `.k5login' file in the root  ac-
     count  to	allow  a ksu(1) to root without having to place anyone at all in
     the wheel group.  This may be the better solution since the wheel mechanism
     still allows an intruder to break root if the intruder has gotten	hold  of
     your  password  file  and can break into a staff account.	While having the
     wheel mechanism is better than having nothing at all, it isn't  necessarily
     the safest option.

     An indirect way to secure the root account is to secure your staff accounts
     by using an alternative login access method and *'ing out the crypted pass-
     word for the staff accounts.  This way an intruder may be able to steal the
     password  file  but  will not be able to break into any staff accounts (or,
     indirectly, root, even if root has a crypted password associated with  it).
     Staff  members  get into their staff accounts through a secure login mecha-
     nism such as kerberos(1) or ssh(1) using a private/public key  pair.   When
     you  use  something  like	kerberos  you generally must secure the machines
     which run the kerberos servers and your desktop workstation.  When you  use
     a	public/private	key pair with ssh, you must generally secure the machine
     you are logging in FROM (typically your workstation), but you can also  add
     an  additional  layer  of protection to the key pair by password protecting
     the keypair when you create it with ssh-keygen(1).  Being able to *-out the
     passwords for staff accounts also guarantees that staff  members  can  only
     login  through  secure  access  methods  that you have setup.  You can thus
     force all staff members to use secure, encrypted connections for all  their
     sessions  which  closes  an important hole used by many intruders:  That of
     sniffing the network from an unrelated, less secure machine.

     The more indirect security mechanisms also assume that you are  logging  in
     from  a more restrictive server to a less restrictive server.  For example,
     if your main  box	is  running  all  sorts  of  servers,  your  workstation
     shouldn't	be  running any.  In order for your workstation to be reasonably
     secure you should run as few servers as possible, up to  and  including  no
     servers at all, and you should run a password-protected screen blanker.  Of
     course,  given  physical  access to a workstation an attacker can break any
     sort of security you put on it.  This is  definitely  a  problem  that  you
     should  consider but you should also consider the fact that the vast major-
     ity of break-ins occur remotely, over a network, from  people  who  do  not
     have physical access to your workstation or servers.

     Using  something  like  kerberos  also  gives you the ability to disable or
     change the password for a staff account in one place and  have  it  immedi-
     ately effect all the machine the staff member may have an account on.  If a
     staff  member's  account  gets compromised, the ability to instantly change
     his password on all machines should not be underrated.  With discrete pass-
     words, changing a password on N machines can be a mess.  You can  also  im-
     pose  re-passwording  restrictions  with kerberos:  not only can a kerberos
     ticket be made to timeout after a while, but the kerberos	system	can  re-
     quire  that  the  user choose a new password after a certain period of time
     (say, once a month).

SECURING ROOT - ROOT-RUN SERVERS AND SUID/SGID BINARIES
     The prudent sysadmin only runs the servers he needs to, no more,  no  less.
     Be  aware that third party servers are often the most bug-prone.  For exam-
     ple, running an old version of imapd or popper is like giving  a  universal
     root  ticket out to the entire world.  Never run a server that you have not
     checked out carefully.  Many servers do not need to be run  as  root.   For
     example,  the  ntalk, comsat, and finger daemons can be run in special user
     `sandboxes'.  A sandbox isn't perfect unless you go to a  large  amount  of
     trouble,  but  the  onion approach to security still stands:  If someone is
     able to break in through a server running in a sandbox, they still have  to
     break out of the sandbox.	The more layers the attacker must break through,
     the lower the likelihood of his success.  Root holes have historically been
     found  in	virtually  every server ever run as root, including basic system
     servers.  If you are running a machine through which people only login  via
     sshd  and	never  login via telnetd or rshd or rlogind, then turn off those
     services!

     FreeBSD now defaults to running ntalkd, comsat, and finger  in  a	sandbox.
     Another  program  which  may  be  a  candidate  for running in a sandbox is
     named(8).	The default rc.conf includes  the  arguments  necessary  to  run
     named  in	a sandbox in a commented-out form.  Depending on whether you are
     installing a new system or upgrading an existing system, the  special  user
     accounts  used by these sandboxes may not be installed.  The prudent sysad-
     min would research and implement sandboxes for servers whenever possible.

     There are a number of other servers that typically do not run in sandboxes:
     sendmail, popper, imapd, ftpd, and others.  There are alternatives to  some
     of these, but installing them may require more work then you are willing to
     put  (the	convenience  factor  strikes  again).  You may have to run these
     servers as root and rely on other mechanisms to detect break-ins that might
     occur through them.

     The other big potential root hole in a system are the  suid-root  and  sgid
     binaries  installed on the system.  Most of these binaries, such as rlogin,
     reside in /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, or /usr/sbin.  While nothing is 100% safe,
     the system-default suid and sgid  binaries  can  be  considered  reasonably
     safe.   Still, root holes are occasionally found in these binaries.  A root
     hole was found in Xlib in 1998 that made xterm (which  is	typically  suid)
     vulnerable.   It  is  better to be safe than sorry and the prudent sysadmin
     will restrict suid binaries that only staff should run to a  special  group
     that  only  staff	can access, and get rid of (chmod 000) any suid binaries
     that nobody uses.	A server with no display  generally  does  not	need  an
     xterm  binary.   Sgid  binaries can be almost as dangerous.  If an intruder
     can break an sgid-kmem binary the intruder might be able to read  /dev/kmem
     and thus read the crypted password file, potentially compromising any pass-
     worded  account.  Alternatively an intruder who breaks group kmem can moni-
     tor keystrokes sent through pty's, including pty's used by users who  login
     through secure methods.  An intruder that breaks the tty group can write to
     almost any user's tty.  If a user is running a terminal program or emulator
     with a keyboard-simulation feature, the intruder can potentially generate a
     data  stream  that  causes  the user's terminal to echo a command, which is
     then run as that user.

SECURING USER ACCOUNTS
     User accounts are usually the most difficult to secure.  While you can  im-
     pose Draconian access restrictions on your staff and *-out their passwords,
     you may not be able to do so with any general user accounts you might have.
     If  you  do have sufficient control then you may win out and be able to se-
     cure the user accounts properly.  If not, you simply have to be more  vigi-
     lant  in  your  monitoring  of those accounts.  Use of ssh and kerberos for
     user accounts is more problematic due to the extra administration and tech-
     nical support required, but still	a  very  good  solution  compared  to  a
     crypted password file.

SECURING THE PASSWORD FILE
     The only sure fire way is to *-out as many passwords as you can and use ssh
     or kerberos for access to those accounts.	Even though the crypted password
     file (/etc/spwd.db) can only be read by root, it may be possible for an in-
     truder  to  obtain read access to that file even if the attacker cannot ob-
     tain root-write access.

     Your security scripts should always check for and	report	changes  to  the
     password file (see `Checking file integrity' below).

SECURING THE KERNEL CORE, RAW DEVICES, AND FILE SYSTEMS
     If  an  attacker  breaks  root he can do just about anything, but there are
     certain conveniences.  For example,  most	modern	kernels  have  a  packet
     sniffing  device driver built in.	Under FreeBSD it is called the `bpf' de-
     vice.  An intruder will commonly attempt to run a packet sniffer on a  com-
     promised  machine.  You do not need to give the intruder the capability and
     most systems should not have the bpf device compiled in.

     But even if you turn off the  bpf	device,  you  still  have  /dev/mem  and
     /dev/kmem to worry about.	For that matter, the intruder can still write to
     raw  disk devices.  Also, there is another kernel feature called the module
     loader, kldload(8).  An enterprising intruder can use a KLD module  to  in-
     stall  his own bpf device or other sniffing device on a running kernel.  To
     avoid these problems you have to run the kernel at a higher  secure  level,
     at  least	securelevel  1.  The securelevel can be set with a sysctl on the
     kern.securelevel variable.  Once you have set the securelevel to  1,  write
     access  to  raw  devices  will be denied and special chflags flags, such as
     `schg', will be enforced.	You must also ensure that the `schg' flag is set
     on critical startup binaries, directories, and script  files  -  everything
     that  gets run up to the point where the securelevel is set.  This might be
     overdoing it, and upgrading the system is much more difficult when you  op-
     erate at a higher secure level.  You may compromise and run the system at a
     higher secure level but not set the schg flag for every system file and di-
     rectory  under  the sun.  Another possibility is to simply mount / and /usr
     read-only.  It should be noted that being too draconian in what you attempt
     to protect may prevent the all-important detection of an intrusion.

CHECKING FILE INTEGRITY: BINARIES, CONFIG FILES, ETC
     When it comes right down to it, you can only protect your core system  con-
     figuration  and  control  files so much before the convenience factor rears
     its ugly head.  For example, using chflags to set the schg bit on	most  of
     the  files in / and /usr is probably counterproductive because while it may
     protect the files, it also closes a detection window.  The  last  layer  of
     your security onion is perhaps the most important - detection.  The rest of
     your  security is pretty much useless (or, worse, presents you with a false
     sense of safety) if you cannot detect potential incursions.  Half	the  job
     of  the onion is to slow down the attacker rather than stop him in order to
     give the detection side of the equation a chance to catch him in the act.

     The best way to detect an incursion is to look for  modified,  missing,  or
     unexpected  files.  The best way to look for modified files is from another
     (often centralized) limited-access system.  Writing your  security  scripts
     on  the  extra-secure  limited-access system makes them mostly invisible to
     potential hackers, and this is important.	In order to take maximum  advan-
     tage  you	generally have to give the limited-access box significant access
     to the other machines in the business, usually either by doing a  read-only
     NFS  export  of the other machines to the limited-access box, or by setting
     up ssh keypairs to allow the limit-access box to ssh to the other machines.
     Except for its network traffic, NFS is the least visible method -	allowing
     you  to  monitor  the file systems on each client box virtually undetected.
     If your limited-access server is connected to the client  boxes  through  a
     switch,  the NFS method is often the better choice.  If your limited-access
     server is connected to the client boxes through a hub  or	through  several
     layers  of  routing,  the NFS method may be too insecure (network-wise) and
     using ssh may be the better choice even with the  audit-trail  tracks  that
     ssh lays.

     Once you give a limit-access box at least read access to the client systems
     it is supposed to monitor, you must write scripts to do the actual monitor-
     ing.  Given an NFS mount, you can write scripts out of simple system utili-
     ties such as find(1) and md5(1) It is best to physically md5 the client-box
     files  boxes  at  least once a day, and to test control files such as those
     found in /etc and /usr/local/etc even  more  often.   When  mismatches  are
     found relative to the base md5 information the limited-access machine knows
     is  valid, it should scream at a sysadmin to go check it out.  A good secu-
     rity script will also check for inappropriate suid binaries and for new  or
     deleted files on system partitions such as / and /usr

     When  using  ssh  rather than NFS, writing the security script is much more
     difficult.   You essentially have to scp the scripts to the client  box  in
     order to run them, making them visible, and for safety you also need to scp
     the  binaries (such as find) that those scripts use.  The ssh daemon on the
     client box may already be compromised.  All in all, using ssh may be neces-
     sary when running over unsecure links, but it's also a lot harder	to  deal
     with.

     A	good  security script will also check for changes to user and staff mem-
     bers access configuration files: .rhosts, .shosts, .ssh/authorized_keys and
     so forth... files that might fall outside the purview of the MD5 check.

     If you have a huge amount of user disk space it may take too  long  to  run
     through  every file on those partitions.  In this case, setting mount flags
     to disallow suid binaries and devices on those partitions is a  good  idea.
     The  `nodev'  and `nosuid' options (see mount(8)) are what you want to look
     into.  I would scan them anyway at least once a week, since the  object  of
     this layer is to detect a break-in whether or not the breakin is effective.

     Process  accounting (see accton(8)) is a relatively low-overhead feature of
     the operating system which I recommend using as a post-break-in  evaluation
     mechanism.   It  is  especially useful in tracking down how an intruder has
     actually broken into a system, assuming the file is still intact after  the
     break-in occurs.

     Finally,  security  scripts should process the log files and the logs them-
     selves should be generated in as secure a manner as possible - remote  sys-
     log  can  be  very  useful.  An intruder tries to cover his tracks, and log
     files are critical to the sysadmin trying to track down the time and method
     of the initial break-in.  One way to keep a permanent  record  of	the  log
     files  is to run the system console to a serial port and collect the infor-
     mation on a continuing basis through a secure machine monitoring  the  con-
     soles.

PARANOIA
     A little paranoia never hurts.  As a rule, a sysadmin can add any number of
     security  features  as  long as they do not effect convenience, and can add
     security features that do effect convenience with some added thought.  Even
     more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up a bit - if  you
     use  recommendations  such as those given by this manual page verbatim, you
     give away your methodologies to the prospective hacker who also has  access
     to this manual page.

SPECIAL SECTION ON D.O.S. ATTACKS
     This section covers Denial of Service attacks.  A DOS attack is typically a
     packet  attack.   While  there  isn't  much you can do about modern spoofed
     packet attacks that saturate your network, you can generally limit the dam-
     age by ensuring that the attacks cannot take down your servers.

	   1.	Limiting server forks

	   2.	Limiting springboard attacks (ICMP response attacks, ping broad-
		cast, etc...)

	   3.	Kernel Route Cache

     A common DOS attack is against a forking server that attempts to cause  the
     server  to  eat  processes,  file descriptors, and memory until the machine
     dies.  Inetd (see inetd(8)) has several options to limit this sort  of  at-
     tack.   It  should  be noted that while it is possible to prevent a machine
     from going down it is not generally possible to prevent a service from  be-
     ing  disrupted by the attack.  Read the inetd manual page carefully and pay
     specific attention to the -c, -C, and -R options.	Note that spoofed-IP at-
     tacks will circumvent the -C option to inetd, so typically a combination of
     options must be used.  Some standalone  servers  have  self-fork-limitation
     parameters.

     Sendmail has its -OMaxDaemonChildren option which tends to work much better
     than  trying  to  use sendmail's load limiting options due to the load lag.
     You should specify a MaxDaemonChildren parameter when  you  start	sendmail
     high  enough  to handle your expected load but no so high that the computer
     cannot handle that number of sendmails without falling on its face.  It  is
     also  prudent to run sendmail in queued mode (-ODeliveryMode=queued) and to
     run the daemon  (sendmail	-bd)  separate	from  the  queue-runs  (sendmail
     -q15m).   If  you	still  want realtime delivery you can run the queue at a
     much lower interval, such as -q1m, but be	sure  to  specify  a  reasonable
     MaxDaemonChildren option for that sendmail to prevent cascade failures.

     Syslogd  can  be  attacked directly and it is strongly recommended that you
     use the -s option whenever possible, and the -a option otherwise.

     You should also be fairly careful with connect-back services such	as  tcp-
     wrapper's reverse-identd, which can be attacked directly.	You generally do
     not want to use the reverse-ident feature of tcpwrappers for this reason.

     It is a very good idea to protect internal services from external access by
     firewalling  them	off at your border routers.  The idea here is to prevent
     saturation attacks from outside your LAN, not so much to  protect	internal
     services from network-based root compromise.  Always configure an exclusive
     firewall,	i.e.  `firewall  everything *except* ports A, B, C, D, and M-Z'.
     This way you can firewall off all of your low ports except for certain spe-
     cific services such as named (if you are primary for a zone), ntalkd, send-
     mail, and other internet-accessible services.  If you try to configure  the
     firewall the other way - as an inclusive or permissive firewall, there is a
     good  chance  that  you will forget to `close' a couple of services or that
     you will add a new internal service and forget to update the firewall.  You
     can still open up the high-numbered port range on	the  firewall  to  allow
     permissive-like  operation  without compromising your low ports.  Also take
     note that FreeBSD allows you to control the range of port numbers used  for
     dynamic binding via the various net.inet.ip.portrange sysctl's (sysctl -a |
     fgrep  portrange),  which	can  also ease the complexity of your firewall's
     configuration.  I usually use a normal first/last range of  4000  to  5000,
     and  a hiport range of 49152 to 65535, then block everything under 4000 off
     in my firewall (except for certain specific internet-accessible  ports,  of
     course).

     Another  common  DOS  attack  is  called a springboard attack - to attack a
     server in a manner that causes the server to generate responses which  then
     overload  the  server,  the local network, or some other machine.	The most
     common attack of this nature is the ICMP PING BROADCAST  attack.	The  at-
     tacker  spoofs  ping  packets sent to your LAN's broadcast address with the
     source IP address set to the actual machine they wish to attack.	If  your
     border  routers  are  not	configured  to	stomp on ping's to broadcast ad-
     dresses, your LAN winds up generating sufficient responses to  the  spoofed
     source  address  to  saturate the victim, especially when the attacker uses
     the same trick on several dozen broadcast addresses over several dozen dif-
     ferent networks at once.  Broadcast attacks of over a  hundred  and  twenty
     megabits have been measured.  A second common springboard attack is against
     the  ICMP	error  reporting  system.  By constructing packets that generate
     ICMP error responses, an attacker can saturate a server's incoming  network
     and  cause the server to saturate its outgoing network with ICMP responses.
     This type of attack can also crash the server by running it out of  mbuf's,
     especially  if the server cannot drain the ICMP responses it generates fast
     enough.  The  FreeBSD  kernel  has  a  new  kernel  compile  option  called
     ICMP_BANDLIM which limits the effectiveness of these sorts of attacks.  The
     last  major class of springboard attacks is related to certain internal in-
     etd services such as the udp echo service.  An attacker simply spoofs a UDP
     packet with the source address being server A's echo port, and the destina-
     tion address being server B's echo port, where server A and B are	both  on
     your  LAN.   The two servers then bounce this one packet back and forth be-
     tween each other.	The attacker can overload both servers	and  their  LANs
     simply  by  injecting a few packets in this manner.  Similar problems exist
     with the internal chargen port.  A competent sysadmin will turn off all  of
     these inetd-internal test services.

     Spoofed packet attacks may also be used to overload the kernel route cache.
     Refer to the net.inet.ip.rtexpire, rtminexpire, and rtmaxcache sysctl para-
     meters.   A  spoofed  packet attack that uses a random source IP will cause
     the kernel to generate a temporary cached route in the route  table,  view-
     able  with  `netstat  -rna  | fgrep W3'.  These routes typically timeout in
     1600 seconds or so.  If the kernel detects that the cached route table  has
     gotten  too  big it will dynamically reduce the rtexpire but will never de-
     crease it to less than rtminexpire.  There are two problems:  (1) The  ker-
     nel  does not react quickly enough when a lightly loaded server is suddenly
     attacked, and (2) The rtminexpire is not low enough for the kernel to  sur-
     vive a sustained attack.  If your servers are connected to the internet via
     a T3 or better it may be prudent to manually override both rtexpire and rt-
     minexpire	via  sysctl(8).   Never set either parameter to zero (unless you
     want to crash the machine :-)).   Setting	both  parameters  to  2  seconds
     should be sufficient to protect the route table from attack.

ACCESS ISSUES WITH KERBEROS AND SSH
     There are a few issues with both kerberos and ssh that need to be addressed
     if  you intend to use them.  Kerberos V is an excellent authentication pro-
     tocol but the kerberized telnet and rlogin suck rocks.  There are bugs that
     make them unsuitable for dealing with binary  streams.   Also,  by  default
     kerberos  does not encrypt a session unless you use the -x option.  Ssh en-
     crypts everything by default.

     Ssh works quite well in every respect except when it is set up  to  forward
     encryption  keys.	What this means is that if you have a secure workstation
     holding keys that give you access to the rest of the system, and you ssh to
     an unsecure machine, your keys become exposed.  The actual keys  themselves
     are  not  exposed,  but  ssh installs a forwarding port for the duration of
     your login and if a hacker has broken root on the unsecure machine  he  can
     utilize that port to use your keys to gain access to any other machine that
     your keys unlock.

     We  recommend that you use ssh in combination with kerberos whenever possi-
     ble for staff logins.  Ssh can be compiled with kerberos support.	This re-
     duces your reliance on potentially exposable ssh keys  while  at  the  same
     time  protecting  passwords via kerberos.	Ssh keys should only be used for
     automated tasks from secure machines (something that kerberos  is	unsuited
     to).   We also recommend that you either turn off key-forwarding in the ssh
     configuration, or that you make use of the from=IP/DOMAIN option  that  ssh
     allows  in its authorized_keys file to make the key only usable to entities
     logging in from specific machines.

SEE ALSO
     chflags(1),  find(1),  md5(1),  netstat(1),  openssl(1),  ssh(1),	 xdm(1),
     group(5),	ttys(5),  accton(8),  init(8),	kerberos(8), sshd(8), sysctl(8),
     syslogd(8), vipw(8)

HISTORY
     The security manual page was originally written by Matthew Dillon and first
     appeared in FreeBSD 3.1, December 1998.

FreeBSD 5.2.1		       September 18, 1999		     SECURITY(7)

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