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MAC_PARTITION(4)	     Kernel Interfaces Manual		MAC_PARTITION(4)

NAME
     mac_partition -- process partition policy

SYNOPSIS
     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the
     following lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the
     following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The  mac_partition  policy  module  implements  a process partition policy,
     which allows administrators to place running processes  into  "partitions",
     based  on	their  numeric process partition (specified in the process's MAC
     label).  Processes with a specified partition can only see  processes  that
     are  in the same partition.  If no partition is specified for a process, it
     can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy  re-
     strictions  not  defined  in  this  man  page).   No provisions for placing
     processes into multiple partitions are available.

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:

	   partition/value

     Where value can be any integer value or "none".  For example:

	   partition/1
	   partition/20
	   partition/none

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ddb(4), mac_ifoff(4),  mac_lo-
     mac(4),   mac_mls(4),   mac_none(4),  mac_portacl(4),  mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and	was  de-
     veloped by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This  software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates
     Labs, the Security Research Division  of  Network	Associates  Inc.   under
     DARPA/SPAWAR  contract  N66001-01-C-8035  ("CBOSS"),  as  part of the DARPA
     CHATS research program.

BUGS
     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support  the  containment  of
     the  root	user,  not  all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,  in
     isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

FreeBSD ports 15.quarterly	  July 25, 2015 		MAC_PARTITION(4)

Want to link to this manual page? Use this URL:
<https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=mac_partition&sektion=4&manpath=FreeBSD+15.1-RELEASE+and+Ports.quarterly>

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