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SSHD(8)			  BSD System Manager's Manual		       SSHD(8)

     sshd -- OpenSSH SSH daemon

     sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec]
	  [-c host_certificate_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]
	  [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]

     sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1).  Together these
     programs replace rlogin(1)	and rsh(1), and	provide	secure encrypted com-
     munications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.

     sshd listens for connections from clients.	 It is normally	started	at
     boot from /etc/rc.d/sshd.	It forks a new daemon for each incoming	con-
     nection.  The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentica-
     tion, command execution, and data exchange.

     sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
     (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override	values speci-
     fied in the configuration file.  sshd rereads its configuration file when
     it	receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name
     and options it was	started	with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.

     The options are as	follows:

     -4	     Forces sshd to use	IPv4 addresses only.

     -6	     Forces sshd to use	IPv6 addresses only.

     -b	bits
	     Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
	     server key	(default 1024).

     -C	connection_spec
	     Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
	     mode.  If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
	     file that would apply to the specified user, host,	and address
	     will be set before	the configuration is written to	standard out-
	     put.  The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value
	     pairs.  The keywords are "user", "host", and "addr".  All are re-
	     quired and	may be supplied	in any order, either with multiple -C
	     options or	as a comma-separated list.

     -c	host_certificate_file
	     Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify	sshd during
	     key exchange.  The	certificate file must match a host key file
	     specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration	direc-

     -D	     When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
	     become a daemon.  This allows easy	monitoring of sshd.

     -d	     Debug mode.  The server sends verbose debug output	to standard
	     error, and	does not put itself in the background.	The server
	     also will not fork	and will only process one connection.  This
	     option is only intended for debugging for the server.  Multiple
	     -d	options	increase the debugging level.  Maximum is 3.

     -e	     When this option is specified, sshd will send the output to the
	     standard error instead of the system log.

     -f	config_file
	     Specifies the name	of the configuration file.  The	default	is
	     /etc/ssh/sshd_config.  sshd refuses to start if there is no con-
	     figuration	file.

     -g	login_grace_time
	     Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (de-
	     fault 120 seconds).  If the client	fails to authenticate the user
	     within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.  A
	     value of zero indicates no	limit.

     -h	host_key_file
	     Specifies a file from which a host	key is read.  This option must
	     be	given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal	host key files
	     are normally not readable by anyone but root).  The default is
	     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol	version	1, and
	     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key,	/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key and
	     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2.	It is possible
	     to	have multiple host key files for the different protocol	ver-
	     sions and host key	algorithms.

     -i	     Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8).  sshd is normally
	     not run from inetd	because	it needs to generate the server	key
	     before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of
	     seconds.  Clients would have to wait too long if the key was re-
	     generated every time.  However, with small	key sizes (e.g.	512)
	     using sshd	from inetd may be feasible.

     -k	key_gen_time
	     Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol	version	1 server key
	     is	regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).  The motiva-
	     tion for regenerating the key fairly often	is that	the key	is not
	     stored anywhere, and after	about an hour it becomes impossible to
	     recover the key for decrypting intercepted	communications even if
	     the machine is cracked into or physically seized.	A value	of
	     zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.

     -o	option
	     Can be used to give options in the	format used in the configura-
	     tion file.	 This is useful	for specifying options for which there
	     is	no separate command-line flag.	For full details of the	op-
	     tions, and	their values, see sshd_config(5).

     -p	port
	     Specifies the port	on which the server listens for	connections
	     (default 22).  Multiple port options are permitted.  Ports	speci-
	     fied in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored
	     when a command-line port is specified.  Ports specified using the
	     ListenAddress option override command-line	ports.

     -q	     Quiet mode.  Nothing is sent to the system	log.  Normally the be-
	     ginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is

     -T	     Extended test mode.  Check	the validity of	the configuration
	     file, output the effective	configuration to stdout	and then exit.
	     Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the connec-
	     tion parameters using one or more -C options.

     -t	     Test mode.	 Only check the	validity of the	configuration file and
	     sanity of the keys.  This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
	     configuration options may change.

     -u	len  This option is used to specify the	size of	the field in the utmp
	     structure that holds the remote host name.	 If the	resolved host
	     name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
	     instead.  This allows hosts with very long	host names that	over-
	     flow this field to	still be uniquely identified.  Specifying -u0
	     indicates that only dotted	decimal	addresses should be put	into
	     the utmp file.  -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from making
	     DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration
	     requires it.  Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS in-
	     clude RhostsRSAAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, and using
	     a from="pattern-list" option in a key file.  Configuration	op-
	     tions that	require	DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in
	     AllowUsers	or DenyUsers.

     The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.  The default is to
     use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
     in	sshd_config(5).	 Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA	and RSA	keys; protocol
     1 only supports RSA keys.	For both protocols, each host has a host-spe-
     cific key,	normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host.

     Forward security for protocol 1 is	provided through an additional server
     key, normally 768 bits, generated when the	server starts.	This key is
     normally regenerated every	hour if	it has been used, and is never stored
     on	disk.  Whenever	a client connects, the daemon responds with its	public
     host and server keys.  The	client compares	the RSA	host key against its
     own database to verify that it has	not changed.  The client then gener-
     ates a 256-bit random number.  It encrypts	this random number using both
     the host key and the server key, and sends	the encrypted number to	the
     server.  Both sides then use this random number as	a session key which is
     used to encrypt all further communications	in the session.	 The rest of
     the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish
     or	3DES, with 3DES	being used by default.	The client selects the encryp-
     tion algorithm to use from	those offered by the server.

     For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
     agreement.	 This key agreement results in a shared	session	key.  The rest
     of	the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit
     AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.  The
     client selects the	encryption algorithm to	use from those offered by the
     server.  Additionally, session integrity is provided through a crypto-
     graphic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64 or

     Finally, the server and the client	enter an authentication	dialog.	 The
     client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, pub-
     lic key authentication, challenge-response	authentication,	or password

     Regardless	of the authentication type, the	account	is checked to ensure
     that it is	accessible.  An	account	is not accessible if it	is locked,
     listed in DenyUsers or its	group is listed	in DenyGroups .	 The defini-
     tion of a locked account is system	dependant. Some	platforms have their
     own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( `*LK*'
     on	Solaris	and UnixWare, `*' on HP-UX, containing `Nologin' on Tru64, a
     leading `*LOCKED*'	on FreeBSD and a leading `!' on	most Linuxes).	If
     there is a	requirement to disable password	authentication for the account
     while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to
     something other than these	values (eg `NP'	or `*NP*' ).

     If	the client successfully	authenticates itself, a	dialog for preparing
     the session is entered.  At this time the client may request things like
     allocating	a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP con-
     nections, or forwarding the authentication	agent connection over the se-
     cure channel.

     After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
     The sides then enter session mode.	 In this mode, either side may send
     data at any time, and such	data is	forwarded to/from the shell or command
     on	the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.

     When the user program terminates and all forwarded	X11 and	other connec-
     tions have	been closed, the server	sends command exit status to the
     client, and both sides exit.

     When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:

	   1.	If the login is	on a tty, and no command has been specified,
		prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
		configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).

	   2.	If the login is	on a tty, records login	time.

	   3.	Checks /etc/nologin and	/var/run/nologin; if one exists, it
		prints the contents and	quits (unless root).

	   4.	Changes	to run with normal user	privileges.

	   5.	Sets up	basic environment.

	   6.	Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
		allowed	to change their	environment.  See the
		PermitUserEnvironment option in	sshd_config(5).

	   7.	Changes	to user's home directory.

	   8.	If ~/.ssh/rc exists, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists,
		runs it; otherwise runs	xauth(1).  The "rc" files are given
		the X11	authentication protocol	and cookie in standard input.
		See SSHRC, below.

	   9.	Runs user's shell or command.

     If	the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
     files but before starting the user's shell	or command.  It	must not pro-
     duce any output on	stdout;	stderr must be used instead.  If X11 forward-
     ing is in use, it will receive the	"proto cookie" pair in its standard
     input (and	DISPLAY	in its environment).  The script must call xauth(1)
     because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.

     The primary purpose of this file is to run	any initialization routines
     which may be needed before	the user's home	directory becomes accessible;
     AFS is a particular example of such an environment.

     This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
     something similar to:

	if read	proto cookie &&	[ -n "$DISPLAY"	]; then
		if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
			# X11UseLocalhost=yes
			echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
			    cut	-c11-` $proto $cookie
			# X11UseLocalhost=no
			echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
		fi | xauth -q -

     If	this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if	that does not
     exist either, xauth is used to add	the cookie.

     AuthorizedKeysFile	specifies the file containing public keys for public
     key authentication; if none is specified, the default is
     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys.  Each line	of the file contains one key (empty
     lines and lines starting with a `#' are ignored as	comments).  Protocol 1
     public keys consist of the	following space-separated fields: options,
     bits, exponent, modulus, comment.	Protocol 2 public key consist of: op-
     tions, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.  The options field is	op-
     tional; its presence is determined	by whether the line starts with	a num-
     ber or not	(the options field never starts	with a number).	 The bits, ex-
     ponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version
     1;	the comment field is not used for anything (but	may be convenient for
     the user to identify the key).  For protocol version 2 the	keytype	is
     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521",
     "ssh-dss" or "ssh-rsa".

     Note that lines in	this file are usually several hundred bytes long (be-
     cause of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilo-
     bytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and	RSA keys up to 16
     kilobits.	You don't want to type them in;	instead, copy the,,, or	the file and	edit

     sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol
     2 keys of 768 bits.

     The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option	specifica-
     tions.  No	spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.  The	fol-
     lowing option specifications are supported	(note that option keywords are

	     Specifies that the	listed key is a	certification authority	(CA)
	     that is trusted to	validate signed	certificates for user authen-

	     Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
	     options.  If both certificate restrictions	and key	options	are
	     present, the most restrictive union of the	two is applied.

	     Specifies that the	command	is executed whenever this key is used
	     for authentication.  The command supplied by the user (if any) is
	     ignored.  The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
	     pty; otherwise it is run without a	tty.  If an 8-bit clean	chan-
	     nel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
	     no-pty.  A	quote may be included in the command by	quoting	it
	     with a backslash.	This option might be useful to restrict	cer-
	     tain public keys to perform just a	specific operation.  An	exam-
	     ple might be a key	that permits remote backups but	nothing	else.
	     Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding	unless
	     they are explicitly prohibited.  The command originally supplied
	     by	the client is available	in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environ-
	     ment variable.  Note that this option applies to shell, command
	     or	subsystem execution.  Also note	that this command may be su-
	     perseded by either	a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive	or a
	     command embedded in a certificate.

	     Specifies that the	string is to be	added to the environment when
	     logging in	using this key.	 Environment variables set this	way
	     override other default environment	values.	 Multiple options of
	     this type are permitted.  Environment processing is disabled by
	     default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
	     This option is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled.

	     Specifies that in addition	to public key authentication, either
	     the canonical name	of the remote host or its IP address must be
	     present in	the comma-separated list of patterns.  See PATTERNS in
	     ssh_config(5) for more information	on patterns.

	     In	addition to the	wildcard matching that may be applied to host-
	     names or addresses, a from	stanza may match IP addresses using
	     CIDR address/masklen notation.

	     The purpose of this option	is to optionally increase security:
	     public key	authentication by itself does not trust	the network or
	     name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
	     somehow steals the	key, the key permits an	intruder to log	in
	     from anywhere in the world.  This additional option makes using a
	     stolen key	more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
	     to	be compromised in addition to just the key).

	     Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for

	     Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
	     Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
	     This might	be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.

     no-pty  Prevents tty allocation (a	request	to allocate a pty will fail).

	     Disables execution	of ~/.ssh/rc.

	     Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
	     Any X11 forward requests by the client will return	an error.

	     Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only con-
	     nect to the specified host	and port.  IPv6	addresses can be spec-
	     ified by enclosing	the address in square brackets.	 Multiple
	     permitopen	options	may be applied separated by commas.  No	pat-
	     tern matching is performed	on the specified hostnames, they must
	     be	literal	domains	or addresses.

	     On	a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for	cer-
	     tificate authentication as	a comma-separated list.	 At least one
	     name from the list	must appear in the certificate's list of prin-
	     cipals for	the certificate	to be accepted.	 This option is	ig-
	     nored for keys that are not marked	as trusted certificate signers
	     using the cert-authority option.

	     Force a tun(4) device on the server.  Without this	option,	the
	     next available device will	be used	if the client requests a tun-

     An	example	authorized_keys	file:

	# Comments allowed at start of line
	ssh-rsa	AAAAB3Nza...LiPk==
	from="*,!" ssh-rsa
	command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
	permitopen="",permitopen="" ssh-dss
	tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==

     The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
     public keys for all known hosts.  The global file should be prepared by
     the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained auto-
     matically:	whenever the user connects from	an unknown host, its key is
     added to the per-user file.

     Each line in these	files contains the following fields: markers (op-
     tional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.  The	fields are
     separated by spaces.

     The marker	is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
     "@cert-authority",	to indicate that the line contains a certification au-
     thority (CA) key, or "@revoked", to indicate that the key contained on
     the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted.	 Only one marker
     should be used on a key line.

     Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (`*' and `?' act as wild-
     cards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host	name
     (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when
     authenticating a server).	A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to indi-
     cate negation: if the host	name matches a negated pattern,	it is not ac-
     cepted (by	that line) even	if it matched another pattern on the line.  A
     hostname or address may optionally	be enclosed within `[' and `]' brack-
     ets then followed by `:' and a non-standard port number.

     Alternately, hostnames may	be stored in a hashed form which hides host
     names and addresses should	the file's contents be disclosed.  Hashed
     hostnames start with a `|'	character.  Only one hashed hostname may ap-
     pear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard opera-
     tors may be applied.

     Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key;
     they can be obtained, for example,	from /etc/ssh/	 The
     optional comment field continues to the end of the	line, and is not used.

     Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are ignored as comments.

     When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if	any
     matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
     the server	has presented a	certificate for	authentication,	the key	of the
     certification authority that signed the certificate.  For a key to	be
     trusted as	a certification	authority, it must use the "@cert-authority"
     marker described above.

     The known hosts file also provides	a facility to mark keys	as revoked,
     for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
     stolen.  Revoked keys are specified by including the "@revoked" marker at
     the beginning of the key line, and	are never accepted for authentication
     or	as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from
     ssh(1) when they are encountered.

     It	is permissible (but not	recommended) to	have several lines or differ-
     ent host keys for the same	names.	This will inevitably happen when short
     forms of host names from different	domains	are put	in the file.  It is
     possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication
     is	accepted if valid information can be found from	either file.

     Note that the lines in these files	are typically hundreds of characters
     long, and you definitely don't want to type in the	host keys by hand.
     Rather, generate them by a	script,	ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking
     /etc/ssh/ and adding the host names at the	front.
     ssh-keygen(1) also	offers some basic automated editing for
     ~/.ssh/known_hosts	including removing hosts matching a host name and con-
     verting all host names to their hashed representations.

     An	example	ssh_known_hosts	file:

	# Comments allowed at start of line
	closenet,...,	1024 37	159...93, ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
	# A hashed hostname
	|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
	# A revoked key
	@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
	# A CA key, accepted for any host in * or *
	@cert-authority	*,* ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...

	     This file is used to suppress printing the	last login time	and
	     /etc/motd,	if PrintLastLog	and PrintMotd, respectively, are en-
	     abled.  It	does not suppress printing of the banner specified by

	     This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
	     more information).	 On some machines this file may	need to	be
	     world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS parti-
	     tion, because sshd	reads it as root.  Additionally, this file
	     must be owned by the user,	and must not have write	permissions
	     for anyone	else.  The recommended permission for most machines is
	     read/write	for the	user, and not accessible by others.

	     This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
	     host-based	authentication without permitting login	with

	     This directory is the default location for	all user-specific con-
	     figuration	and authentication information.	 There is no general
	     requirement to keep the entire contents of	this directory secret,
	     but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for	the
	     user, and not accessible by others.

	     Lists the public keys (DSA/ECDSA/RSA) that	can be used for	log-
	     ging in as	this user.  The	format of this file is described
	     above.  The content of the	file is	not highly sensitive, but the
	     recommended permissions are read/write for	the user, and not ac-
	     cessible by others.

	     If	this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the	user's home directory
	     are writable by other users, then the file	could be modified or
	     replaced by unauthorized users.  In this case, sshd will not al-
	     low it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to

	     This file is read into the	environment at login (if it exists).
	     It	can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start	with
	     `#'), and assignment lines	of the form name=value.	 The file
	     should be writable	only by	the user; it need not be readable by
	     anyone else.  Environment processing is disabled by default and
	     is	controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.

	     Contains a	list of	host keys for all hosts	the user has logged
	     into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
	     keys.  The	format of this file is described above.	 This file
	     should be writable	only by	root/the owner and can,	but need not
	     be, world-readable.

	     Contains initialization routines to be run	before the user's home
	     directory becomes accessible.  This file should be	writable only
	     by	the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.

	     Access controls that should be enforced by	tcp-wrappers are de-
	     fined here.  Further details are described	in hosts_access(5).

	     This file is for host-based authentication	(see ssh(1)).  It
	     should only be writable by	root.

	     Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
	     Exchange".	 The file format is described in moduli(5).

	     See motd(5).

	     If	this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
	     in.  The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
	     log in, and non-root connections are refused.  The	file should be

	     This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but al-
	     lows host-based authentication without permitting login with

	     These three files contain the private parts of the	host keys.
	     These files should	only be	owned by root, readable	only by	root,
	     and not accessible	to others.  Note that sshd does	not start if
	     these files are group/world-accessible.

	     These three files contain the public parts	of the host keys.
	     These files should	be world-readable but writable only by root.
	     Their contents should match the respective	private	parts.	These
	     files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
	     convenience of the	user so	their contents can be copied to	known
	     hosts files.  These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).

	     Systemwide	list of	known host keys.  This file should be prepared
	     by	the system administrator to contain the	public host keys of
	     all machines in the organization.	The format of this file	is de-
	     scribed above.  This file should be writable only by root/the
	     owner and should be world-readable.

	     Contains configuration data for sshd.  The	file format and	con-
	     figuration	options	are described in sshd_config(5).

	     Similar to	~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
	     login-time	initializations	globally.  This	file should be
	     writable only by root, and	should be world-readable.

	     chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
	     the pre-authentication phase.  The	directory should not contain
	     any files and must	be owned by root and not group or world-

	     Contains the process ID of	the sshd listening for connections (if
	     there are several daemons running concurrently for	different
	     ports, this contains the process ID of the	one started last).
	     The content of this file is not sensitive;	it can be world-read-

     scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1),	ssh-keygen(1),
     ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2),	hosts_access(5), login.conf(5),	moduli(5),
     sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8)

     OpenSSH is	a derivative of	the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
     de	Raadt and Dug Song removed many	bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
     ated OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
     versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
     for privilege separation.

     System security is	not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are dis-
     abled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).

BSD			       October 28, 2010				   BSD


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