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VERIFY(1)			    OpenSSL			     VERIFY(1)

       openssl-verify, verify -	Utility	to verify certificates

       openssl verify [-help] [-CAfile file] [-CApath directory] [-no-CAfile]
       [-no-CApath] [-allow_proxy_certs] [-attime timestamp] [-check_ss_sig]
       [-CRLfile file] [-crl_download] [-crl_check] [-crl_check_all] [-engine
       id] [-explicit_policy] [-extended_crl] [-ignore_critical]
       [-inhibit_any] [-inhibit_map] [-nameopt option] [-no_check_time]
       [-partial_chain]	[-policy arg] [-policy_check] [-policy_print]
       [-purpose purpose] [-suiteB_128]	[-suiteB_128_only] [-suiteB_192]
       [-trusted_first]	[-no_alt_chains] [-untrusted file] [-trusted file]
       [-use_deltas] [-verbose]	[-auth_level level] [-verify_depth num]
       [-verify_email email] [-verify_hostname hostname] [-verify_ip ip]
       [-verify_name name] [-x509_strict] [-show_chain]	[-] [certificates]

       The verify command verifies certificate chains.

	   Print out a usage message.

       -CAfile file
	   A file of trusted certificates.  The	file should contain one	or
	   more	certificates in	PEM format.

       -CApath directory
	   A directory of trusted certificates.	The certificates should	have
	   names of the	form: hash.0 or	have symbolic links to them of this
	   form	("hash"	is the hashed certificate subject name:	see the	-hash
	   option of the x509 utility).	Under Unix the c_rehash	script will
	   automatically create	symbolic links to a directory of certificates.

	   Do not load the trusted CA certificates from	the default file

	   Do not load the trusted CA certificates from	the default directory

	   Allow the verification of proxy certificates.

       -attime timestamp
	   Perform validation checks using time	specified by timestamp and not
	   current system time.	timestamp is the number	of seconds since
	   01.01.1970 (UNIX time).

	   Verify the signature	of the last certificate	in a chain if the
	   certificate is supposedly self-signed.  This	is prohibited and will
	   result in an	error if it is a non-conforming	CA certificate with
	   key usage restrictions not including	the keyCertSign	bit.  This
	   verification	is disabled by default because it doesn't add any

       -CRLfile	file
	   The file should contain one or more CRLs in PEM format.  This
	   option can be specified more	than once to include CRLs from
	   multiple files.

	   Attempt to download CRL information for this	certificate.

	   Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting	to look	up a
	   valid CRL.  If a valid CRL cannot be	found an error occurs.

	   Checks the validity of all certificates in the chain	by attempting
	   to look up valid CRLs.

       -engine id
	   Specifying an engine	id will	cause verify(1)	to attempt to load the
	   specified engine.  The engine will then be set as the default for
	   all its supported algorithms.  If you want to load certificates or
	   CRLs	that require engine support via	any of the -trusted,
	   -untrusted or -CRLfile options, the -engine option must be
	   specified before those options.

	   Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).

	   Enable extended CRL features	such as	indirect CRLs and alternate
	   CRL signing keys.

	   Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which	is not
	   supported by	OpenSSL	the certificate	is rejected (as	required by
	   RFC5280).  If this option is	set critical extensions	are ignored.

	   Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).

	   Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).

       -nameopt	option
	   Option which	determines how the subject or issuer names are
	   displayed. The option argument can be a single option or multiple
	   options separated by	commas.	 Alternatively the -nameopt switch may
	   be used more	than once to set multiple options. See the x509(1)
	   manual page for details.

	   This	option suppresses checking the validity	period of certificates
	   and CRLs against the	current	time. If option	-attime	timestamp is
	   used	to specify a verification time,	the check is not suppressed.

	   Allow verification to succeed even if a complete chain cannot be
	   built to a self-signed trust-anchor,	provided it is possible	to
	   construct a chain to	a trusted certificate that might not be	self-

       -policy arg
	   Enable policy processing and	add arg	to the user-initial-policy-set
	   (see	RFC5280). The policy arg can be	an object name an OID in
	   numeric form.  This argument	can appear more	than once.

	   Enables certificate policy processing.

	   Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.

       -purpose	purpose
	   The intended	use for	the certificate. If this option	is not
	   specified, verify will not consider certificate purpose during
	   chain verification.	Currently accepted uses	are sslclient,
	   sslserver, nssslserver, smimesign, smimeencrypt. See	the VERIFY
	   OPERATION section for more information.

       -suiteB_128_only, -suiteB_128, -suiteB_192
	   Enable the Suite B mode operation at	128 bit	Level of Security, 128
	   bit or 192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
	   See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported	signature
	   algorithms are reduced to support only ECDSA	and SHA256 or SHA384
	   and only the	elliptic curves	P-256 and P-384.

	   When	constructing the certificate chain, use	the trusted
	   certificates	specified via -CAfile, -CApath or -trusted before any
	   certificates	specified via -untrusted.  This	can be useful in
	   environments	with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs.  As	of OpenSSL
	   1.1.0 this option is	on by default and cannot be disabled.

	   By default, unless -trusted_first is	specified, when	building a
	   certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not
	   trusted, then OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted issuer
	   certificates	with certificates from the trust store to see if an
	   alternative chain can be found that is trusted.  As of OpenSSL
	   1.1.0, with -trusted_first always on, this option has no effect.

       -untrusted file
	   A file of additional	untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer
	   CAs)	used to	construct a certificate	chain from the subject
	   certificate to a trust-anchor.  The file should contain one or more
	   certificates	in PEM format.	This option can	be specified more than
	   once	to include untrusted certificates from multiple	files.

       -trusted	file
	   A file of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless
	   the -partial_chain option is	specified.  The	file contains one or
	   more	certificates in	PEM format.  With this option, no additional
	   (e.g., default) certificate lists are consulted.  That is, the only
	   trust-anchors are those listed in file.  This option	can be
	   specified more than once to include trusted certificates from
	   multiple files.  This option	implies	the -no-CAfile and -no-CApath
	   options.  This option cannot	be used	in combination with either of
	   the -CAfile or -CApath options.

	   Enable support for delta CRLs.

	   Print extra information about the operations	being performed.

       -auth_level level
	   Set the certificate chain authentication security level to level.
	   The authentication security level determines	the acceptable
	   signature and public	key strength when verifying certificate
	   chains.  For	a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of
	   all the certificates	must meet the specified	security level.	 The
	   signature algorithm security	level is enforced for all the
	   certificates	in the chain except for	the chain's trust anchor,
	   which is either directly trusted or validated by means other	than
	   its signature.  See SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3) for the
	   definitions of the available	levels.	 The default security level is
	   -1, or "not set".  At security level	0 or lower all algorithms are
	   acceptable.	Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent
	   security and	is broadly interoperable, though it will, for example,
	   reject MD5 signatures or RSA	keys shorter than 1024 bits.

       -verify_depth num
	   Limit the certificate chain to num intermediate CA certificates.  A
	   maximal depth chain can have	up to num+2 certificates, since
	   neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate
	   count against the -verify_depth limit.

       -verify_email email
	   Verify if the email matches the email address in Subject
	   Alternative Name or the email in the	subject	Distinguished Name.

       -verify_hostname	hostname
	   Verify if the hostname matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name
	   or Common Name in the subject certificate.

       -verify_ip ip
	   Verify if the ip matches the	IP address in Subject Alternative Name
	   of the subject certificate.

       -verify_name name
	   Use default verification policies like trust	model and required
	   certificate policies	identified by name.  The trust model
	   determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable to
	   verifying the given certificate chain.  See the -addtrust and
	   -addreject options of the x509(1) command-line utility.  Supported
	   policy names	include: default, pkcs7, smime_sign, ssl_client,
	   ssl_server.	These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust
	   settings used in SSL, CMS and S/MIME.  As of	OpenSSL	1.1.0, the
	   trust model is inferred from	the purpose when not specified,	so the
	   -verify_name	options	are functionally equivalent to the
	   corresponding -purpose settings.

	   For strict X.509 compliance,	disable	non-compliant workarounds for
	   broken certificates.

	   Display information about the certificate chain that	has been built
	   (if successful). Certificates in the	chain that came	from the
	   untrusted list will be flagged as "untrusted".

       -   Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed
	   to be certificate files. This is useful if the first	certificate
	   filename begins with	a -.

	   One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given,
	   verify will attempt to read a certificate from standard input.
	   Certificates	must be	in PEM format.

       The verify program uses the same	functions as the internal SSL and
       S/MIME verification, therefore, this description	applies	to these
       verify operations too.

       There is	one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
       by the verify program: wherever possible	an attempt is made to continue
       after an	error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the
       first error. This allows	all the	problems with a	certificate chain to
       be determined.

       The verify operation consists of	a number of separate steps.

       Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting	from the supplied
       certificate and ending in the root CA.  It is an	error if the whole
       chain cannot be built up.  The chain is built up	by looking up the
       issuers certificate of the current certificate.	If a certificate is
       found which is its own issuer it	is assumed to be the root CA.

       The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a
       number of steps.	 After all certificates	whose subject name matches the
       issuer name of the current certificate are subject to further tests.
       The relevant authority key identifier components	of the current
       certificate (if present)	must match the subject key identifier (if
       present)	and issuer and serial number of	the candidate issuer, in
       addition	the keyUsage extension of the candidate	issuer (if present)
       must permit certificate signing.

       The lookup first	looks in the list of untrusted certificates and	if no
       match is	found the remaining lookups are	from the trusted certificates.
       The root	CA is always looked up in the trusted certificate list:	if the
       certificate to verify is	a root certificate then	an exact match must be
       found in	the trusted list.

       The second operation is to check	every untrusted	certificate's
       extensions for consistency with the supplied purpose. If	the -purpose
       option is not included then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf"
       certificate must	have extensions	compatible with	the supplied purpose
       and all other certificates must also be valid CA	certificates. The
       precise extensions required are described in more detail	in the
       CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS section of the x509 utility.

       The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The
       root CA should be trusted for the supplied purpose.  For	compatibility
       with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate	with no	trust settings
       is considered to	be valid for all purposes.

       The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain.
       For each	element	in the chain, including	the root CA certificate, the
       validity	period as specified by the "notBefore" and "notAfter" fields
       is checked against the current system time.  The	-attime	flag may be
       used to use a reference time other than "now."  The certificate
       signature is checked as well (except for	the signature of the typically
       self-signed root	CA certificate,	which is verified only if the
       -check_ss_sig option is given).

       If all operations complete successfully then certificate	is considered
       valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.

       When a verify operation fails the output	messages can be	somewhat
       cryptic.	The general form of the	error message is:

	server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty	Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
	error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate

       The first line contains the name	of the certificate being verified
       followed	by the subject name of the certificate.	The second line
       contains	the error number and the depth.	The depth is number of the
       certificate being verified when a problem was detected starting with
       zero for	the certificate	being verified itself then 1 for the CA	that
       signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text	version	of the error
       number is presented.

       A partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this
       also includes the name of the error code	as defined in the header file
       x509_vfy.h Some of the error codes are defined but never	returned:
       these are described as "unused".

	   The operation was successful.

	   Unspecified error; should not happen.

	   The issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be
	   found. This normally	means the list of trusted certificates is not

	   The CRL of a	certificate could not be found.

	   The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means	that
	   the actual signature	value could not	be determined rather than it
	   not matching	the expected value, this is only meaningful for	RSA

	   The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means	that the
	   actual signature value could	not be determined rather than it not
	   matching the	expected value.	Unused.

	   The public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could	not be

	   The signature of the	certificate is invalid.

	   The signature of the	certificate is invalid.

	   The certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date	is after the
	   current time.

	   The certificate has expired:	that is	the notAfter date is before
	   the current time.

	   The CRL is not yet valid.

	   The CRL has expired.

	   The certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.

	   The certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.

	   The CRL lastUpdate field contains an	invalid	time.

	   The CRL nextUpdate field contains an	invalid	time.

	   An error occurred trying to allocate	memory.	This should never

	   The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate
	   cannot be found in the list of trusted certificates.

	   The certificate chain could be built	up using the untrusted
	   certificates	but the	root could not be found	locally.

	   The issuer certificate could	not be found: this occurs if the
	   issuer certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.

	   No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one
	   certificate and it is not self signed.

	   The certificate chain length	is greater than	the supplied maximum
	   depth. Unused.

	   The certificate has been revoked.

	   A CA	certificate is invalid.	Either it is not a CA or its
	   extensions are not consistent with the supplied purpose.

	   The basicConstraints	pathlength parameter has been exceeded.

	   The supplied	certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.

	   The root CA is not marked as	trusted	for the	specified purpose.

	   The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.

	   Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0	as a result of the deprecation of the
	   -issuer_checks option.

	   Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0	as a result of the deprecation of the
	   -issuer_checks option.

	   Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0	as a result of the deprecation of the
	   -issuer_checks option.

	   Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0	as a result of the deprecation of the
	   -issuer_checks option.

	   Unable to get CRL issuer certificate.

	   Unhandled critical extension.

	   Key usage does not include CRL signing.

	   Unhandled critical CRL extension.

	   Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings.

	   Proxy path length constraint	exceeded.

	   Proxy certificate subject is	invalid.  It MUST be the same as the
	   issuer with a single	CN component added.

	   Key usage does not include digital signature.

	   Proxy certificates not allowed, please use -allow_proxy_certs.

	   Invalid or inconsistent certificate extension.

	   Invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension.

	   No explicit policy.

	   Different CRL scope.

	   Unsupported extension feature.

	   RFC 3779 resource not subset	of parent's resources.

	   Permitted subtree violation.

	   Excluded subtree violation.

	   Name	constraints minimum and	maximum	not supported.

	   Application verification failure. Unused.

	   Unsupported name constraint type.

	   Unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax.

	   Unsupported or invalid name syntax.

	   CRL path validation error.

	   Path	loop.

	   Suite B: certificate	version	invalid.

	   Suite B: invalid public key algorithm.

	   Suite B: invalid ECC	curve.

	   Suite B: invalid signature algorithm.

	   Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS.

	   Suite B: cannot sign	P-384 with P-256.

	   Hostname mismatch.

	   Email address mismatch.

	   IP address mismatch.

	   DANE	TLSA authentication is enabled,	but no TLSA records matched
	   the certificate chain.  This	error is only possible in s_client(1).

	   EE certificate key too weak.

	   CA certificate key too weak.

	   CA signature	digest algorithm too weak.

	   nvalid certificate verification context.

	   Issuer certificate lookup error.

	   Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs	found.

	   Proxy subject name violation.

	   Returned by the verify callback to indicate an OCSP verification is

	   Returned by the verify callback to indicate OCSP verification

	   Returned by the verify callback to indicate that the	certificate is
	   not recognized by the OCSP responder.

       Although	the issuer checks are a	considerable improvement over the old
       technique they still suffer from	limitations in the underlying
       X509_LOOKUP API.	One consequence	of this	is that	trusted	certificates
       with matching subject name must either appear in	a file (as specified
       by the -CAfile option) or a directory (as specified by -CApath).	If
       they occur in both then only the	certificates in	the file will be

       Previous	versions of OpenSSL assume certificates	with matching subject
       name are	identical and mishandled them.

       Previous	versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the


       The -show_chain option was added	in OpenSSL 1.1.0.

       The -issuer_checks option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and is
       silently	ignored.

       Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors.	All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed	under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You	may not	use
       this file except	in compliance with the License.	 You can obtain	a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

1.1.1k				  2021-03-25			     VERIFY(1)


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